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Book Review 
Luc Ferry, A Brief History of Thought (New York: 
Harper, 2011), 304 pp. 
Luc Ferry’s A Brief History of Thought is an engaging, accessible work. It 
makes no pretense to being a comprehensive history, but it does tell a story 
that provides strong evidence for an important conception of philosophy’s 
enduring relevance. For Ferry, “all philosophies, however divergent they 
may sometimes be in the answers they bring, promise us an escape from 
primitive fears. They possess in common with religions the conviction that 
anguish prevents us from living good lives: it stops us not only from being 
happy, but also from being free.” (10) From the earliest Greek era, 
philosophers have sought to respond to the anxiety provoked by the “fear of 
the irreversible,” the fear arising from our inescapable limitations and 
mortality. This fear keeps people from thinking and acting freely. So the 
ultimate question for philosophers is how does one persuade people to 
“save” themselves. Even if Ferry’s claim is not true in all cases, one would be 
hard put to deny that this has been a major factor in philosophy’s history. 
Ferry regards religion as philosophy’s rival, but he does not denounce 
it. He does not believe that religious faith is absurd or that one can prove 
that there is no God. But both the problem of evil and the promise of some 
afterlife that many religions announce strain credulity to the breaking point. 
When thoughtful people have come to doubt the religious answers, they 
have turned to philosophy to find a way to “save” themselves from the fear 
of the “irreversible.” 
In a way that brings back to mind the famous Kantian triad: What can I 
know? What ought I to do? What can I hope for? Ferry identifies three 
dimensions of philosophy. There is “theory” that seeks to discover the full 
scope of what exists. It is a “deep reflection upon reality, or things as they 
are.” (12) There is ethics that is concerned with human conduct. It considers 
what we ought to do or avoid. And thirdly, there is the culminating question 
of wisdom, the question of what we ought to aim to accomplish in our lives 
as a whole. It asks what it is to be a “sage,” namely someone who lives 
“wisely, contentedly and as freely as possible, having finally overcome the 
fears sparked in us by our own finiteness.” (15) The history of thought is the 
story of philosophers efforts to answer these questions. 
Ferry begins his story with interesting, though brief, discussions of 
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Stoicism and Christianity. These discussions lay the groundwork for his 
main project, namely telling the story of Modernity, its origins, its central 
convictions, and its aftermath. 
Stoicism, for Ferry is the culmination of ancient Greek thought.  It 
taught that, beneath the apparent chaos of things, there is a cosmos, a 
logically well-ordered and harmonious universe that serves as the model for 
all good human conduct. The task for human beings is to find their rightful 
places within this cosmos. Generally speaking for the Stoics, “the good was 
what was in accord with the cosmic order, whether one willed it or not and 
what was bad ran contrary to this order, whether one liked it or not.” (31) 
Death is part of this natural order, but it is not an annihilation. Instead, it is a 
passage to a different way of being part of the cosmos. “Because the universe 
is eternal, we will remain forever a fragment—we too will never cease to 
exist.” (37) 
For the Stoics, the two great obstacles to achieving wisdom are nostalgia 
or attachment to the past and hope or anxiety about the future. In truth, 
there is no other reality than the one in which we live here and now. If we 
squarely face this reality, neither poverty nor illness nor death will 
discomfort us. We will love the world no matter what happens.  
Whatever its strengths, though, Stoicism’s attempt to relieve us of the 
fears associated with death is unsatisfactory. Its doctrine of salvation “is 
resolutely anonymous and impersonal.” (52) Death obliterates a person’s 
identity. Christianity took advantage of this inadequacy and developed a 
new conception of salvation that held sway for almost 1500 years. 
The doctrine of salvation that Christianity proclaims is based on a 
personal God and is available to anyone. The ultimate source of this 
salvation is Christian charity, which embraces everyone. And unique among 
religions is its doctrine of personal resurrection. Thus, “the Christian 
response to mortality, for believers at least, is without question the most 
‘effective’ of all responses.” (90) 
But this response carries a high price. Instead of thinking for oneself, the 
Christian is supposed to put his or her trust in “the Man-God, Christ, who 
claims to be the son of God, the Logos incarnate.” (63) Faith has priority of 
over reason and philosophy is turned into a dry scholasticism that is no 
longer a living source of wisdom. 
The Christian worldview collapsed under the impact of the works of 
Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. Taken together, these works 
undercut both religious authority and the conception of the universe as a 
finite, harmoniously ordered universe. They ushered in a time of 
bewilderment and radical skepticism. Henceforth the fundamental question 
for philosophy is: “How do we confront the fragility and finiteness of 
human existence, the mortality of all things in this world, in the absence of 
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any principle external to and higher than humanity”? (135)  
Two philosophers are at the forefront of the Modern response. One is 
Descartes, who sought to banish doubt by developing a method of thought 
that could prevent error and could make modern science possible. The other 
is Kant, who established disinterestedness and universality as the criteria for 
all ethically proper conduct. Building upon the works of these two figures, 
Modernity’s answer to the question of  “salvation” is: We save our lives by 
devoting them to or sacrificing them for some noble cause. Among the 
proposed noble causes are (a) the truths of science, (b) the security and 
welfare of one’s homeland, and (c) some form of political revolution, e.g., 
the French Revolution or Communism. 
Nonetheless, whatever the attractiveness of any of these noble causes, 
“even if we devote ourselves to a ‘higher’ cause, in the conviction that the 
ideal is infinitely superior to the individual, it remains true that in the end it 
is the individual who suffers and dies” (138). Modernity’s recipe for 
salvation, under the postmodern assault Nietzsche initiated, has shown itself 
to be no real solution. 
Postmodern thought undermines the two main Modern tenets, namely 
the beliefs “that the human individual is at the centre of the world…and that 
reason is an irresistible force for emancipation” (143). Nietzsche argued that 
these tenets are “idols.” They amount to a faith analogous to the religious 
faith that Modernism had rejected. For him, the Modernist search for 
absolute truth demeans the reality of the sensible world by emphasizing 
some ideal, supposedly intelligible, world such as the world of science or of 
religion. 
Instead of the enlightenment conception of salvation, Nietzsche 
promotes the notion of “eternal recurrence.” On Ferry’s interpretation, to 
embrace this notion is to adopt as the criterion for deciding which moments 
of life are worthwhile and which are not the “rule” that “regrets and 
remorse have no place and make no sense. Such is the life lived according to 
truth” (187). This criterion leads one to amor fati, “to love the real whatever is 
the case, without picking and choosing, and above all without wishing 
anything to be other than it is” (190).  Nietzsche thus promotes a kind of 
salvation that resembles Stoicism, but with one crucial difference. For him, it 
makes no sense to consider the world a harmonious universe in which each 
thing has its appointed place. 
Nietzsche’s answer, Ferry argues, fails. Is it not, on the one hand, itself 
an ideal? And more importantly, does not a life without genuine ideas lead 
to pure cynicism and unbridled competition (196-97)? Neither Nietzsche nor 
the other postmodern thinkers have a satisfactory rejoinder to the 
technological world we now inhabit, a world devoid of purpose. In this 
world, progress is “reduced to meaning no more than the automatic 
outcome of the free competition between its constituent parts” (215). Against 
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this backdrop, Ferry proposes his own conception of the kind of salvation 
philosophy can reasonably promote today. 
Alasdair MacIntyre concluded his After Virtue with a provocative claim, 
namely that today the intellectual choice is between Nietzsche and St. 
Benedict. Ferry offers a “third way.” Nietzsche overthrew the idols of the 
Enlightenment, but at the price of denying that there are any transcendent 
values to live for, values we do not invent but instead discover, By contrast, 
in the history of thought, Christianity’s doctrine of salvation has no equal. 
Nothing can match its promise of a resurrection of our bodies and reunion 
with those we love in the next life. But if we, like Ferry, cannot believe in 
Christ, “then we must learn to think differently about the ultimate question 
posed in all doctrines of salvation, namely that of the death of a loved one” 
(361). 
Ferry’s own answer is a call for a new humanism, a humanism without 
metaphysics. The theoretical dimension of this new humanism emphasizes 
the kind of self-knowledge that the study of history induces. To approach 
the present without prejudices we cannot ignore the ways in which the past 
weighs upon us. 
The moral dimension of this humanism amounts to a secularized 
restatement of the content of Christianity, but without invoking God. This is 
“a reversal of divinization, or a making sacred of the human” (245). This 
reversal appears, for example in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and in the several humanitarian interventions that call for treating enemies 
no less well than friends. 
Ferry’s conception of salvation has three principal components. First, as 
Kant saw, this wisdom requires an “enlarged thought” that understands 
human life as an invitation and exhortation to us “to come out of ourselves 
the better to find ourselves—which…enables us better to know and love 
others” (252). 
The second component is the recognition of the wisdom of love. 
Profound human love is not merely the love of some particular traits that the 
beloved may possess. Nor is it simply an abstract love for humanity. It is the 
love for some specific, unique person or persons, whatever they do or 
undergo. The beloved is recognized and embraced in his or her 
irreplaceability or singularity. 
But death disrupts our loves. The third component of Ferry’s wisdom is 
the acceptance of the fact of unavoidable death. Resolutely facing the fact of 
death can teach us to live and love as adults, It can show us what we need to 
do here and now with and for those we love, but from whom death is sure 
to separate us. This wisdom, Ferry concludes, “is the crowning achievement 
of a humanism released finally from the illusions of metaphysics and 
religion” (264). 
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The sobriety and fairmindedness that Ferry’s story displays are 
admirable. And readers of Paul Ricoeur’s works will find in the kind of 
wisdom that Ferry advocates much that they can profitably compare with 
the Ricoeurian reflections on Christianity, hope, and natality, that Olivier 
Abel so felicitously calls attention to in his Preface to Ricoeur’s Living up to 
Death. For my part, I find Ricoeur’s “wisdom” notably richer than Ferry’s. 
But that conclusion is by no means a negative judgment about A Brief History 
of Thought. 
Bernard Dauenhauer 
University of Georgia 
